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I. Bature of the

Pro~lea

Pollution of ambient air is •ost often a aulti-source problem.
Because some of these sources may be located in different
jurisdictions subject to different legal •tandards or constraints,
protection of ambient air quality in these circumstances poses
unique legal problems.
From a legal perspective, the •ost
difficult problems are those involving transnational air pollution
since regulators must take account of the different legal systems
as well as the different standards.
By contrast, interstate
problems are, by their nature, more easily susceptible to federal
solution.
The authors of the Clean Air Act have attempted to
address both international and interstate air pollution problems.
In each case, they have met with little success.

II. Regulation of International Air Pollution
A. Clean Air Act, § 115: Authorizes the EPA to require states
responsible for air pollution that may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign
country, to revise tbeir state implementation plans to prevent
such air pollution.
Preconditions that must be met before EPA can act:
1.

EPA must have reports, surveys or studies from any duly
constituted international agency that support the alleged
pollution, OR a request from the Secretary of State to
take action alleging that such pollution exists; AND

2.

EPA must determine that the foreign country affords the
United states ••essentially the same rights" with respect
to the prevention of air pollution problems that emanate
from that country.

B. The only case to date arising under § 115 concerns the
impact of sulfur emissions from facilities in the midwestern
united States on the acid rain problem of Canada. A brief
chronology of events in that case may be helpful to
understanding the how § 115 works. This chronology is set
forth below.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS: CANADIAN/AMERICAN ACID RAIN DISPUTE
10/80: International Joint Commission (IJC) issues the Seventh
Annual Report on Great Lakes water quality, Stating that acid
depositions are endangering public welfare in the u.s. and Canada,
and both countries contribute to the problems of the neighboring
country .
1
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12/17/80: canada adopts legislation allowing their vovernaent to
order the abatement of emissions from Canadian sources which
contribute to transboundary air pollution. Canadian Clean Air Act
Section 21.1.
01/13/81:
Days before leaving office, EPA Administrator Douglas
Costle notifies Secretary of State Edmund Muskie by letter of the
IJC's findings and canada's new legislation pertaining to
transboundary pollution. Costle finds both preconditions to EPA's
action under Section 115 have been met.
06/26/85: State of New York v. Thomas, 613 F.Supp 1472 (D.c. D.C .
1985) •
State of New York and other plaintiffs contend that
Costle's findings of 1/13/81 required EPA to invoke Section 115 of

the Clean Air Act. District Judge Norma Holloway Johnson finds:
(1) that Costle 1 s January 13, 1981 letter to Muskie satisfied both
requirements of Section 115 of the Clean Air Act (613 F.Supp at
1482); and (2) that the EPA Administrator has a mandatory duty to
act under Section 115 of the Clean Air Act once those requirements
are met. Id . at 1477. The District Court ordered Administrator
Thomas to give formal notification to the Governors of states where
harmful emissions originate, in accordance with Section 115.
10/22/85: Lee M. Thomas, EPA Administrator, issues a memoradum on
whether Canada's Clean Air Act meets the reciprocity provision of
Section 115.
Thomas finds that the Canadian law satisfies the
reciprocity requirements of Section 115 insofar as it offers a
comparable procedure to the one established in Section 115.
Nonetheless, Costle finds that Section 115 further requires a
finding that canada will, in fact, implement a comparable control
program if and when the United States is prepared to implement a
program to protect canadian air quality.
09/18/86:
Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert . denied, 107 s.ct 3196 (1987).
The D.C. Court of Appeals
rules that the decision to invoke Section 115 was a rule which
required
adherence
to
APA
rulemaking procedures
before
implementation. The opinion was written by Judge (now Justice)
Scalia and ends with this statement which may portend future
problems for the plaintiff in this controversy: "How and when the
Agency (EPA) chooses to proceed to the stage of notification
triggered by the findings (supporting invocation of Section 115)
is within the agency's discretion and not subject to judicial
compulsion." 802 F~2d at 1448 .

Province of Ontario , State of New York petitions EPA to
publish notice and comment findings by former EPA Administrator
Costle in 1981. New York also requests EPA to publish a notice
that Cana~a has enacted reciprocal laws to protect the U.S. from
Canadian Pollution.
04/07/86:

2
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10/14/86:
Donald Clay, EPA acting assistant administrator,
notifies state of New York that complex questions pertaining to
acid rain and deposition must be answered before any action can be
taken on New York's April 7, 1986 petition. Clay also infonaed New
York that Castle's 1981 statements did not constitute findings
triggering action under Section 115.
11/01/88: The Ontario government petitions u.s. court of Appeals,
D.C. Circuit to order the EPA to begin rule making procedures under
Section 115 of the Clean Air Act.
Ontario is demanding action
based on EPA's refusal to publish Castle's 1981 findings (due to
EPA's belief that insufficient evidence exists to support a
regulatory program). Ontario contends scientific proof exists that
acid rain precursors from smokestacks of the Ohio Valley and
adjacent u.s. states are deposited on Ontario's lakes, forests, and
cities .
III. Regulation of Interstate Pollution
A. Clean Air Act, § 110(a) (2) (E): Requires each states• state
implementation plan (SIP) to contain adequate provisions -(i) prohibiting any stationary source within the State from
emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will
(I) prevent attainment or maintenance by any other state
of any • • • primary or secondary ambient air quality
standard or
(II) interfere with measures required to be included in
the applicable implementation plan for any other state
under Part c to prevent significant deterio~ation of air
quality or to protect visibility, and
(ii) insuring compliance with the requirements of section 126
relating to int~rstate pollution abatement.
B. Clean Air Act, 1 126(a): Requires each SIP to provide 60
days prior written notice to nearby States of major new
sources of air pollution that are either subject to the PSD
provisions of the statute, or which may significantly
contribute to levels of air pollution in excess of the NAAQS
in any AQCR outside the State.
Section 126(b): Authorizes any State to petition the EPA for
a finding that any major source emits or will emit any air
pollutant in violation of 1 110 (a) (2) (E) (i). The EPA must act
on any such petition within 60 days. But see, Air Pollution
Control District v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1984), where
the court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a 22
aonth delay in acting on a petition was not qrounds for
granting the petition unless the plaintiff could show tbat
EPA's failure was arbitrary and capricious.
3
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Section 126(c): Provides that it is a violation of a SIP for
a major new source to be constructed or operated in violation
of I 110(a)(2)(E)(i), notwithstanding that the facility vas
granted a permit by the State. Further, it is a violation of
the SIP for any existing source to continue operations more
than three month after a violation of 1 110(a)(2(E)(i) baa
been found. Extensions beyond this three month period may be
granted under certain conditions so long as they do not exceed
three years.
c. Case Law
Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1982): New York's
Long Island Lighting Company's (LILCO) facilities were using
2.8% sulfur fuel under a temporary SIP provision approved by
EPA.
During this time, Connecticut facilities had been
required by their State SIP to use o.st sulfur fuel.
Subsequently, New York petitioned EPA to allow an indefinite
extension of the 2. 8% sulfur provision.
While New York's
request for a permanent extension of its 2.8% sulfur standard
was pending, Connecticut petitioned EPA to change its • 5%
requirement to 1%. 1
connecticut also petitioned EPA under § 126 of the Act,
alleging that approval of the requested extension by New York
would violate § 110(a)(2)(E)(i).
New York's sulfur fuel
content affected ambient air levels of both S02 and total
suspended particulates (TSP). Connecticut was an attainment
area for S02 but a nonattainment area for TSP. Connecticut
alleged violations of § 110 (a) (2) (E) with respect to both
pollutants. The Court's decision addressed each pollutant
separately.
Sulfur Dioxide: Among other things, the Court found that the
New York proposal could be approved "only if it would not
cause a violation of primary or secondary standards for sulfur
dioxide in connecticut, given Connecticut's then prevailing
emission limitations on its own sources of pollution. ••
(Emphasis added.) Two important conclusions follow. First,
EPA was not, as a matter of law, required to consider the
impact of Connecticut's proposed revision (from 0.5% sulfur
to 1%) before approving the New York proposal. Second, no
violation of § 110(a) (2)(E) (i) (I) exists merely because
pollution from one state has a "substantial impact" on the
1

A separate and unsuccessful challenge to EPA's approval of
connecticut • s change was filed by the Connecticut Fund for tbe
Environment (CFE). connecticut Fund for the Environment v. EPA,
696 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1982). CFE vas a co-plaintiff with the State
of Connecticut in the principal case.
4
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ambient air quality of another •tate.
conclusions is discussed below.
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The first conclusion was not thoroughly analyzed by the
court because EPA had subsequently approved Connecticut • •
proposal and in the course of that decision bad concluded that
the combined effect of the New York and Connecticut decisions
would not cause a violation of Connecticut's 801 standards.
Had it been more thoroughly analyzed, this conclusion would
not have withstood scrutiny. In Ashbacker Radio com. y. Fcc,
326 u.s. 327 (1945) the United States Supreme Court held that
mutually exclusive permit applications for radio broadcasting
licenses which are pending at the same time must be considered
together in order to satisfy due process requirements.
Likewise, two SIP revisions which are mutually exclusive (in
the sense that both could not be approved without causing a
violation of the NAAQS) ought to be considered concurrently
in order to insure that the agency •akes a concrete choice
from between alternative proposals. Thus, where State X is
facing SIP revisions from State Y which •ay adversely affect
the ambient air in State X, state X might reasonably propose
a revision that would allow its own sources to utilize the
available increments of clean air and demand that EPA consider
the proposals of State X and Y concurrently. To the extent
that current law encourages this negative form of competition
for pollution rights, it should be changed.
The second conclusion which obtains from the court's
findings is that a state cannot establish a violation of §
1lO(a)(2)(E}(i)(I), merely by showing that pollution from
another state has a substantial impact on ambient air in the
receiving state. The court reaches this conclusion from a
direct application of the language of § 110 (a) (2) (E) (i) (I)
which, by it terms, applies only where a source from one state
will "prevent the attainment or maintenance of any ••• national
primary or secondary ambient air quality standard in any other
state. " IsL. since Connecticut was an attainment area for
S02 , no possible violation of the cited provision could be
shown. Interestingly, EPA argued and the court found, that
substantial impacts from interstate air pollution could be
addressed under § llO(a) (2) (E) (i) (II).
That provision
prohibits sources in one state from interfering with "measures
required to be included in the applicable implementation plan
tor any other State under part c to prevent the significant
deterioration of air quality or to protect visibility."
Unfortunately, this provision is wholly useless where as in
the Connecticut case, a state seeks to maintain an existing
practice. This is because the PSD provisions are designed not
to improve air quality, but rather to limit additional
contributions of air pollution into the area.
'l'otal 8uapen4e4 Particulates: As noted previously, Connecticut
5
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was a nonattainment area for particulates. Unfortunately, the
equities which might have worked in Connecticut•• favor with
respect to 502 had Connecticut been a nonattainment area for
S02 , did not exist vi th particulates.
Unlike the 802
standards for the two states, New York's TSP standards were
more stringent than those of connecticut. Moreover, the LILCO
plants were all equipped with electrostatic precipitators.
Althou9h, New York did contribute a small amount of
particulate matter to Connecticut's air, the contributions
were found to be de minimis. Accordingly, the Court held that
they did not "prevent the attainment or maintenance" of the
NAAQS within the meaning of the law. 2
Air Pollution Control District y, EPA 702 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir.
1984) : The Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County,
Kentucky (Louisville area) filed a petition under § 126
alleging violations of § 110(a) (2) (E) (i) by the Gallagher
Power Station in Floyd County in southern Indiana. Jefferson
county was a nonattainment area for S02 • The Xentucky SIP
imposed an S02 standard of 1. 2 lbsfMBTU on its sources in
Jefferson County. Indiana oriqinally proposed to require that
the Gallagher station meet the same standard but later
obtained EPA approval for a standard of 6 lbs/MBTU -- 5 times
the amount allowed from sources in neighborinq Jefferson
County. The effect was to allow Gallagher to operate without
any S02 pollution controls. Louisville Gas and Electric, the
primary producer of S02 in Jefferson county, had spent $138
million dollars to comply with the Kentucky SIP requirement
for 502 reductions.
EPA conducted a study which showed that the Gallagher
Plant contributed only 3\ of the S02 concentration in those
particular areas in Jefferson County where the NAAQS were
actually being violated.
In other parts of the County,
however, Gallagher contributed as much as 34.5\ of the primary
NAAQS and 47' of the secondary NAAQS. Nonetheless, after 22
months, EPA denied the petition on the grounds that "the
Gallagher plant does not cause or substantially contribute to
a violation of the S02 NAAQS. 11
Jefferson County made two principal arquments. 3

Fir~t,

2

In reaching this conclusion, the court specifically
deferred ruling on EPA's claim that§ llO(a) (2) (E)(i)(I) prohibits
only those SIP revisions which "significantly contribute11 to the
ambient air quality in the affected state.
s The County also argued that I 301(a)(2)(A), which requires
EPA "to assure fairness and uniformity in the criteria, procedures
and policies •••• ", required the court to balance interstate
equities. The court found, however, that this provision related
6
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they claimed that the interstate pollution provisions of the
statute should be construed to allow a state to reserve for
itself a aarqiD of vrowtb.
EPA had originally taken the
position (Carter Administration) that one state could not
interfere with another state's aarqin of growth. Pollowinq
the chanqe in administrations, EPA backed off from this
position .
The court defers to the agency on this.
As a
strict legal matter, the court found that the language of the
Act prohibiting sources in one state from preventing the
attainment or maintenance of the HAAQS in any other State did
not protect a state's aarqin for growth. Arquably, however,
an area projected to grow, needs some margin if it is going
to maintain its ambient air quality. Given the inequity that
existed between Gallagher and the sources of SOi in Jefferson
County, the court might have used this argument to impose some
controls on Gallagher.
Jefferson county also argued that
Gallagher was preventing the attainment of the NAAQS for S02
because it was contributing S01 to an S01 nonattainment area .
EPA argued that this did not establish a violation of §
llO (a) (2) (E) (i) (I) because it did not substantially contribute
to the S02 problem in Jefferson County.
To support this
claim, EPA pointed to a study which showed that Gallagher
contributed only 3% of the S02 in those areas of Jefferson
County where the NAAQS were actually being violated. In other
parts of the county, the Gallagher's contribution consumed as
much as 34% of the primary S02 standard and 47% of secondary
standard. The court accepted EPA's substantial contribution
argument , relying on similar language used at § 126(a) of the
Act.
That provision requires states to provide notice to
other states of those sources that would 11 significantly
contribute" to air pollution in excess of the NAAQS.
The
court reasoned that this provision suggested congressional
concern only with such sources.
D. Restorinq Interstate Equities. Whatever the legal merits
of the Connecticut and Air Pollution Control District
decisions, they plainly do not achieve the conqressional
policy underlying the interstate air pollution provisions of
the law. on the contrary 1 these decisions 1 actually encourage
states to allow polluting industries along their borders to
consume as much of the pollution increments as are available
in both the home state and the neighborinq state. The first
state to consume these increments will apparently be
protected, irrespective of the relative efforts of the two
states to control their sources of pollution, so long as the
polluting state can show that it has not substantially
contributed to violations of the HAAQS. The result in the l l i
Pollution Control District case is particularly troublesoae
only to the administration of the Act and did not implicate
substantive decisions.
7
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because it makes a mockery of Kentucky•• efforts to control
the pollution problem in that state.
What can be done? •PA JlegulatioDs: The easiest and most
logical place to resolve this problem is from within the EPA
itself. The Supreme Court has shown a ~eat willingness to
defer to EPA 1 s interpretation of its laws•, and the language
of I 110 (a) (2) (E) is sufficiently ambiguous to afford the
agency ample discretion to implement the law in a manner that
will encourage pollution control. Two specific suggestions
are offered here.
1. Section llO(a)(2)(E)(i)(I) prohibits foreign states
from preventing the "attainBent or maintenancen of the
ambient air quality standards. EPA and the courts have
shown little interest in giving meaning to the word
11
maintenance 11 • Although, that word might be construed
to address attainment or PSO areas, such areas are more
specifically, and more stringently addressed at §
llO(a) (2) (E) (i) (II)
which
prohibits
states
from
interfering with another state's PSD program. 5 Arguably,
See e.g., Chevron, USA v.
Council, 467 u.s. 837 (1984)

Natural Resources Defense

~, Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1982):
[EPA]
correctly points out that §
[110(a) (2) (E) (i) (II)]
incorporates the provisions of Part c [the PSD program] into this
section of the statute, designed to achieve interstate pollution
abatement . ... Accordingly, the EPA reasonably concluded that §
[110(a) (2) (E) (i) (I) was not intended to do more than prohibit the
agency from approving state implementation plan revisions wbich
will cause violations of the NAAOSs in nearby states... Emphasis
added. The upshot of this language is that§ 110(a)(2)(E)(i)(I)
applies to nonattainment areas (or those areas that would be out
of attainment if a SIP revision is approved), and that §
110(a)(2)(E) (i)II) applies to PSD areas. Since the PSD program
requires states to manage ambient air quality so that increases in
ambient pollution levels do not exceed a specified limit below the
NAAQS, this seems a reasonable construction which insures
comprehensive coverage of all areas.
There are, however, two
potential problems with this interpretation. First, the pollution
increments that are mandated by the PSD program do not apply until
a major emitting facility has been approved in a PSD area, thus
establishing a baseline from which the PSD increments can be
measured. ~Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C.Cir.
1979). Second, despite a conqressional mandate to do so, EPA has
not promulgated pollution increments for certain criteria
pollutants. § 166. See also, Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F.2d 165
(O.Cal. 1987). 'Thus, for these pollutants, the PSD program may
afford no protection beyond that established by the NAAQS.
5
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then tbe word •maintenance• vas intended to address the
long-term trends in ambient air quality in a specific
region. Thus, if a region projects a certain amount of
C)rowtb which will brin; with it associated air pollution,
a state that contributes significant quantities of air
pollution to an area that is currently in attainment, aay
nonetheless prevent the lonq-ran;e •maintenance•• of
ambient air quality in that region. By defining the word
"maintenance", as used in 1 110 (a) (2) (E) (i) (I), to
require protection of the NAAQS against projected
increases in ambient pollution, EPA could reclaim its
authority to control significant sources of pollution
from other states.
2. Even assuming, as the 6th Circuit does, that
substantial contribution is the test for determining
violations of§ llO(a)(2) (E) (i)(I), EPA could and should
insist that the phrase be defined to take account of
interstate equities . Thus, in the Air Pollution Control
District case, the Gallagher plant • s contributions to
Jefferson County should have been treated as substantial,
even though only Jt in those areas of violation, because
Gallagher had no controls on its stacks, while Kentucky·' s
facilities had substantial controls.
It 1s grossly
unfair to insist, as the court's decision does, that the
Kentucky facilities, which have already expended $138
million on air pollution equipment, bear an additional
burden of control .

'·
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COBCLUSIOB
The international and interstate air pollution provisions of
the Clean Air Act were a reasonable atte~t to achieve progress in
confronting transboundary air pollution problems. Unfortunately,
EPA has shown no leadership in implementing these provision•.
While courts might have been expected to demand •tronger
initiatives .by EPA, the current deferential aood in the courts . .de
such relief unlikely.
If EPA continues to hinder progress on
transboundary pollution abatement, Congress should respond with
more specific language.
In the case of international air
pollution,
Congress should disapprove of the reciprocity
determination by Administrator Thomas which requires a showing that
a foreign country has taken substantive action under its provision
that parallels § 115 of the Clean Air Act. This should not be
necessary unless the United states can reasonably claim that the
conditions for invoking the parallel provision of foreign law have
been met. Regarding interstate pollution, Congress should insist
that EPA encourage states which hope to clean their air beyond the
NAAQS, by allowing those states to protect the •argin for growth
that they have created from unreasonable intrusions by foreign
states. In addition, Congress ahould demand that EPA treat states
equitably. Where one state contributes to a nonattainment problem
in another state, EPA should compare the efforts that eacb state
has made to control the air pollution before assessing the
substantiality of each state's contribution.

•.
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Interstate Pollution Abatement
Petition Process
Section 126; 42 U.S.C. § 7426
Petition from 1tate or political 1ubdivi1ion to
administrator that a aource in another ltate emita or,
under propo1ed plan, would emit air pollution that
would prevent attainment
primary or I8CODdary
ambient air quality standards in complainingltate.
l126(b)

or

Within 60 days and after public beariDc eclmini1trator
makes decision. §126(b)

'

Does source in
question prevent
attainment of primary
or secondary

NAAQSs?

l110(a)(2)(E)(i)(I)

(

Does source in
question prevent
mtJinteruuu:e of
primary or leCOndary

NAAQSs?
l110<aX2XEXiXI)

Does source
interfere with
complaining state's
attempt to prevent
the aignificant
deterioration of air
quality?
l110<aX2XEXiXID

Administrator orders otl'encling ltate to amend S.LP.
to comply with l110(aX2Xe)(i)

